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Contempt Of Cop: 
Disrespect In Retrospect 
Scenario 1) A police officer responds 
to a complaint alleging that unknown 
persons are disturbing the peace in a 
public place. While the officer is evaluat-
ing the situation, a neighbor continu-
ously interrupts the officer with ques-
tions and accusations to the extent that 
the officer's ability to effectively resolve 
the situation is severely hampered. The 
officer repeatedly advises the neighbor to 
be quiet and when the neighbor con-
tinues to interrupt he is placed under 
arrest. 
Scenario 2) A police officer arrives at 
the scene of a complaint where several 
intoxicated persons are engaged in 
heated discussions which are about to 
ripen into physical confrontation. A large 
crowd is gathered, shouting encourage-
ment to the participants and attempting 
to esCalate the situation. When the officer 
orders the crowd to disperse, most of the 
peope leave, except one individual who 
states that he was not saying anything, 
that it was a public place and that he had 
a right to be there. After repeated warn-
ings to disperse he is placed under arrest. 
Scenario 3) A police officer is conduct-
ing an undercover surveillance of a busi-
ness where, according to reliable infor-
mation, a burglary is going to occur. A 
suspicious individual appears from the 
shadows near the business, apparently 
preparing to enter. An unrelated third 
party arrives at the location from which 
the officer is conducting his observa-
tions. The officer identifies himself, ex-
plains the situation and requests that the 
individualleave quietly. She leaves imme-
diately but, while doing so, yells to the 
suspect that the police are watching the 
bUilding. The suspect leaves before any 
crime occurs and the entire police opera-
tion is destroyed. The third party is 
placed under arrest. 
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by Hon. Lawrence H. Rushworth 
and Hon. A. Michael Nolan 
I. Introduction 
Every day police officers operate in 
situations which expose them to various 
dangers and difficulties. Proper perform-
ance of their duties is often a thankless 
job. Their arrival on the scene frequently 
is greeted with derision, ridicule and 
harassment. The situations described 
above are typical of those which fre-
quently occur in police work. Recogniz-
ing the unique nature of law enforce-
ment work, the courts and legislature 
have created a special set of laws de-
signed to aid and assist police in effi-
ciently discharging their responsibilities. 
It is hoped that this article will increase 
the understanding in the legal commu-
nity and among law enforcement officers 
of this special set of laws. 
When situations arise which are simi-
lar to those described above, a trouble-
some question presents itself. At what 
point does seemingly harmless and in-
nocuous behavior become criminal in 
nature? In the first scenario, the neigh-
bor is, in aLI probability, merely being 
nosy and is not intending to violate the 
law. In scenario two, the arrestee was 
merely standing on the street, doing 
nothing which inherently violates the 
law. The third scenario is perhaps slightly 
more complicated, but aLI that the ar-
restee did was to warn an individual not 
to violate the law. In most situations, 
such actions, would be commended and 
not result in an arrest. The charges filed 
in these types of scenarios fall into a 
broad category of crime entitled "ob-
struction of justice." 
The crime of obstruction of justice has 
its roots in early common law. Lewis 
Hochheimer, a noted authority on Mary-
land's common law, states that "[w]ithin 
limits not strictly defined acts and omis-
sions immediately injuring the people or 
the government are punishable as misde-
meanors. "I The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land, in Garland v. State,2 agreed that "it 
is an indictable offense at common law to 
obstruct the due administration of jus-
tice."~In 1939, the Maryland General As-
sembly codified the common law offense 
as Article 27 section 30 of the Annotated 
Code, which stated: 
If any person shall corruptly or by 
threats or force endeavor to influ-
ence, intimidate, or impede any ju-
ror, witness, or officer in any court of 
this State in the discharge of his duty 
or shall corruptly or by threats or 
force obstruct or impede, or en-
deavor to obstruct or impede, the 
due administration of justice 
therein, he shall be liable to be 
prosecuted therefor .... 
The statute does not specifiywhich acts 
would violate the section. In Romans v. 
State,5 the court indicated that instead of 
providing a laundry list of prohibited 
offenses, the statute was "in aid and defi-
nition of a class of those criminal acts 
which are known to the common law as 
obstructions of justice."6The proscribed 
conduct, therefore, includes "any at-
tempt to ... corruptly obstruct or impede 
the due administration of justice."7 Vio-
lations in this area include actual ob-
struction of court proceedings, whether 
by jury tampering, by interfering with 
witnesses, or by other means. This article 
will focus on that area of the law which in-
volves impeding law enforcement per-
sonnel in the performance of their as-
signed duties. Before considering those 
violations defined by statute, we will 
discuss the applicable common lawviol~­
tions. 
/ 
n. The Common Law 
A) OBSTRUCTING, RESISTING, OR 
HINDERING A POLICE OFFICER 
Two misdemeanors in this area which 
are still viable at common law: hindering 
or obstructing a police officer and resist-
ing arrest.8 In the late nineteenth cen-
tury, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
prohibited interference with police pro-
cedure. In Roddy v. Finnegan,9 the court 
stated that if a party, who is not con-
cerned with the violation of the law 
under investigation, obstructs a police 
officer who is inquiring into the viola-
tion, the officer has the right to arrest that 
person. 10 In Roddy, the police officer 
attempted to determine who had illegally 
parked a wagon on the street. Finnegan, 
the owner of the business where the 
wagon was being unloaded, interrupted 
the police officer, and told him to stop 
interfering with his business. After a brief 
scu ffie , Finnegan was arrested. When 
tried for the offense, Finnegan was found 
not guilty. He filed suit against Roddy for 
assault and battery and Roddy appealed 
the judgment for Finnegan. Reversing 
the lower court, the court of appeals ex-
plained that "police officers, like other 
officers of the law, are not to be mal-
treated [while they are] in the faithful 
discharge of their duty," and that they 
were to be able to perform their activities 
"free from malice, ill will, oppression, or 
the use of any unnecessary force."n To 
the contrary, the court indicated that 
police officers were "entitled to aid and 
assistance."12 
In Busch v. State,13 the court acknowl-
edged the continuing viability of the 
Roddy decision stating: 
In Roddy, this Court acknowledged 
that resisting an officer in the per-
formance of his duties was an of-
fense that could occur even before 
there was an arrest. Accordingly, this 
case demonstrates that an arrest is 
not essential to the offense of resist-
ing, hindering, or obstructing an of-
ficer in the performance of his du-
ties. 14 
Two years later, the court of appeals in 
Cover v. State)) again considered the 
question of impeding a police operation 
and listed the elements of the crime of 
obstructing and hindering a police offi-
cer: 
1) A police officer engaged in the 
performance of a duty; 
2) An act, or perhaps an omission, by 
the accused which obstructs or hin-
ders the officer in the performance 
of that duty; 
3) Knowledge by the accused of the 
facts comprising (1); and 
4) Intent to obstruct or hinder the 
officer by the act or omission consti-
tuting (2) above.16 
The Cover court engaged in a thor-
ough analysis of the history and tradition 
of the common law crime. Quoting a 
British law review article, the court de-
fined three separate and distinct catego-
ries of violations: 
1) Positive direct obstruction: Those 
cases in which the constable acts di-
rectly against the citizen or his prop-
erty and is physically restrained; 
2) Passive direct obstruction: Those 
cases "in which the constable seeks 
to make the citizen act directly, and 
the citizen refuses or fails to act as 
required; and 
3) Positive indirect obstruction: 
Those cases in which "the police are 
not acting directly against the citi-
zen, but are acting indirectly against 
other citizens who are, or may be 
about to commit offences (sic) 
against the criminal law, and a citi-
zen does an act which obstructs 
them in their general duty to prevent 
or detect crime, intending to frus-
trate the police operation.)7 
"police officers were 
'entitled to aid and 
assistance. '" 
Violations in the first category, positive 
direct obstruction, are probably the most 
frequent. They most often occurwhen an 
officer is attempting to investigate a sus-
pected violation of the law and an unin-
volved third party inserts himself into the 
investigation in an attempt to inhibit its 
effectiveness. However, there must be an 
actual obstruction of the officer. "Merely 
being impertinent to an officer, or daring 
him to make an arrest has been declared 
insufficient to amount interference with 
him in the performance of his duties."18 
InHoward v. State, 19 police officers were 
attempting to place the defendant'S wife 
under arrest when Howard struck the ar-
resting officer to prevent his wife's de-
tention. He was convicted of resisting 
and hindering a police officer in the 
lawful performance of his duties. While 
often the interference in these cases is 
physical, as in Howard, courts have 
upheld violations alleging indirect inter-
ference as well. In Mayne v. State, 20 
Mayne discovered his wife's body along 
with physical evidence, including a knife, 
which was indicative of suicide. The 
court held that his substitution of a differ-
ent knife and the making of false state-
ments to the police constituted a crime 
(obstruction of justice). This category 
also includes those cases wherein an indi-
vidual is being investigated or even ar-
rested by the police and provides false in-
formation as to his identity, address, or 
other facts, in an attempt to misdirect the 
inquiry. The key consideration is that the 
interference must adversely impact the 
officer's effectiveness in handling the 
situation at hand; the ultimate outcome 
of the investigation is of no consequence. 
The second category, passive direct 
obstruction, is almost as frequent as the 
first category. These cases usually con-
cern an officer giving an individual or a 
group an order to leave the area of an 
incident. These "move along" cases result 
in the arrest of an individual who fails to 
comply with the officer's order. In Mary-
land, several statutes exist which cover 
this area of interference which will be ex-
amined in this article. 
In Cover, the court dealt with the third 
category, positive indirect obstruction. 
The facts were similar to those in the 
third scenario at the beginning of this 
article. The alleged interference, how-
ever, was the repeated blowing of an 
automobile horn, not a definitive verbal 
warning. Ms. Cover was convicted of 
obstructing and hindering a police offi-
cer. The court of appeals reversed the 
lower court's decision and held that 
there was not a sufficient showing that 
the blowing of the horn was for the 
purpose of alerting the suspect. 21 While a 
warning would constitute interference 
as envisioned in these types of crimes, the 
facts of the case at hand were held insuf-
ficient to support such a finding. 
B) RESISTING ARREST 
The second common law misde-
meanor in this area of law is resisting 
arrest. "A refusal to submit to lawful 
arrest and resistance to an officer of the 
law in the performance of his duties 
constitutes an offense at common law, 
and is an offense in this State."22 There 
are five elements which have to be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to 
establish guilt: 1) there has to be an arrest 
of the defendant; 2) the arrest must have 
been lawful; 3) the defendant must have 
refused to submit to the arrest; 4) the 
arrest must have been made by an officer 
of the law, and must have been in the 
course of the lawful performance of his 
duties; and 5) the officer must have iden-
tified himself as a police officer. 23 The key 
difference between this offense and re-
Sisting, obstructing, or hindering a po-
20.2/fhe Law Forum-17 
lice officer is that in resisting arrest, the 
resistance must be to an actual arrest. 
It is generally held that resistance to an 
unlawful arrest is permissible. "[I]n such 
case, the officer not only is not acting in 
the performance of official duties, but 
contrary to them, for such conduct can 
only be regarded as a trespass against the 
person whom he illegally arrests."24 Cit-
ing several sources, the Sugarman court 
stated that "one illegally arrested may use 
any reasonable means to effect his es-
cape, even to the extent of using such 
force as is reasonably necessary."25 The 
major problem with this doctrine is that 
only a court can rule on the validity of an 
arrest. The individual placed under ar-
rest may truly believe that he is resisting 
an unlawful arrest, but later learn that his 
resistance was criminal because the court 
determined the arrest to be valid.26 
In Rodgers v. State, 27 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland further limited 
this lawful resistance doctrine. The case 
presented the question of the propriety 
of resistance to an arrest upon a judicially 
issued arrest warrant, even when the ar-
restee believed that the warrant was inva-
lid or improper. Reviewing the case law 
on resisting arrest, the court found that 
the cases supporting resistance to unlaw-
ful arrest were all related to warrantless 
arrests. In a warrantless arrest Situation, 
the arrest is generally made immediately 
upon discovery of a crime, often at the 
scene when emotions are high and there 
is little, if any, time to reflect upon the 
validity of the arrest. The court noted, 
however, that: 
where a warrant is the basis of the ar-
rest, it presumably has been issued 
in the quiet atmosphere surround-
ing the issuing judicial officer where 
he has had an opportunity to reflect 
upon and measure the facts pre-
sented to him before reaching his 
decision to issue the arrest warrant. 
Once it is issued, the police have no 
alternative than to perform the min-
isterial duty of executing the judicial 
officer's order. 
The court further stated: 
[An] individual may not lawfully use 
force to resist an arrest where he has 
been advised by authorized police 
officers that a warrant for his arrest 
has been duly issued and that, pursu-
ant to the command of the warrant, 
the officers are endeavoring to effect 
his arrest, even though it is later de-
termined at a judicial hearing the 
warrant was defective.29 
An important distinction has been 
noted by the courts between the act of 
resisting arrest and flight from a police 
officer to avoid apprehension. In run-
ning from an officer who may be attempt-
18-The Law Forum!20.2 
ing to effect an arrest, an individual is 
merely avoiding an arrest and not resist-
ing the officer's attempts. ''Jerking away 
from an officer is obstructing him, but 
cursing him is not. "30 Additionally, the re-
sistance must be during the actual arrest. 
If an individual is under arrest and being 
transported to the police station and 
while enroute, strikes the transporting 
police officer, he is certainly gUilty of 
battery, but not of resisting arrest.31 
Furthermore, commentators have noted 
that generally, some type of overt act is 
necessary to constitute the resistance. 
For mere words to be sufficient, they 
must be of such a nature and spoken in 
such circumstances that the person mak-
ing the arrest must have "reasonable 
grounds to believe that he cannot pro-
ceed with the arrest without incurring 
evident risk of serious injury."32 
it one illegally 
arrested may use 
any reasonable 
means to effect his 
rh " escayB ... 
III. Statutory Violations 
A) CRIMINAL CODE 
In addition to the common law viola-
tions, there are several statutes which de-
fine specific crimes within this category. 
Article 27, section 150 states: 
Any person who makes a false state-
ment, report, or complaint, or who 
causes a false statement, report, or 
complaint to be made, to any peace 
or police officer of the State, or of any 
county, city or other political subdi-
vision of this State, knowing the 
same, or any material part thereof, to 
be false and with the intent to de-
ceive and with the intent to cause an 
investigation or other action to be 
taken as a result thereof, shall be 
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor 
and upon conviction, shall be sub-
ject to a fine of not more than five 
hundred dollars ($500.00), orbeim-
prisoned not more than six (6) 
months, or be both fined and impris-
oned, in the discretion of the court. H 
In tbe King v. Manley,34 the British 
court defined the making of a false state-
ment or report to the police causing the 
police to "devote their time and services 
to the investigation of [the] idle charge" 
as the crime of "effecting a public mis-
chief." The cases in Maryland which have 
involved section 150 have dealt mostly 
with situations similar to those in 
Manley, in which a false report of a crime 
resulted in a police officer initiating an 
investigation "to the end that the public 
was deprived of the services of the 
police."H The United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland noted 
that neither the common law nor this sec-
tion clearly excludes or includes lying to 
the police as a crime, and that the crimi-
nality of a statement depends on the 
circumstances involved.36 
In 7bomas v. State,37 the defendant re-
ported to police that while walking down 
the street, he was shot in the foot by the 
occupant of a passing vehicle. Although 
he felt pain, he stated that he did not 
realize until later that evening that he had 
been shot when he noticed blood on his 
shoe. The police investigation ultimately 
revealed that the defendant had shot 
himself in the foot during a violent con-
frontation with an individual who was 
killed. 
In Sine v. State,38 the defendant staged 
an automobile accident involving a U-
Haul truck which was operated by a party 
to the scheme. The driver of the truck was 
clearly at fault in the "accident," and the 
conspirators hoped to realize a sizeable 
settlement from the U-Haul company. In 
an appeal from his conviction for making 
a false statement or report to the police, 
Sine argued that he had not made any 
statements to the police. He further ar-
gued that the statements made by his 
friends were not false because the U-Haul 
truck actually struck the car involved in 
the accident. In answering the first of 
these contentions, the court held that 
while Sine personally made no state-
ments to the police officers, the state-
ments which were made were a "part and 
parcel" of the scheme to defraud the 
company. Since the crime was a misde-
meanor, all participants in the scheme 
were prinCipals to the crime.39 As to the 
second argument, the court held that 
while the statements may have been at 
least partially true, they were made in 
such a manner as to indicate the intent to 
deceive. Thus they were false for the pur-
poses of Article 27 section 150.40 
Several cases have considered whether 
the wording of the statute is broad 
enough to include cases involving more 
than the Manley type of violation. The 
statute includes a "false statement" in ad-
dition to false report or complaint, re-
sulting not only in an investigation, but 
also any "other action" to be taken as the 
result of the falSity. In 1988, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland considered 
the question and made a definitive ruling 
as to the scope of the law. In Johnson v. 
State,41 the issue presented was whether 
the giving of false identification (such as 
name Qr address), in response to ques-
tioning by the police after an individual 
was placed under arrest, was within sec-
tion 150. The court construed the section 
to apply to "that type of mischief [which 
was] the 'false alarm' to the police that is 
analogous to the false fire alarm."42 Con-
tinuing, the court stated that Johnson 
had not gone to the police to make a false 
statement and that his purpose was to 
divert an ongoing investigation, not to 
initiate one. 
We do not believe the giving offalse 
information in response to routine 
questioning by the police, even 
though it is likely to hinder or delay 
an investigation already underway, 
is the type of false statement, report, 
or complaint that comes within the 
'false alarm' public mischief the Gen-
eral Assembly intended to criminal-
ize when it enacted section 150.43 
The court specifically avoided the 
question of whether lying to the police 
was a criminal offense, although they 
suggested that it may possibly constitute 
the crime of obstructing, hindering, or 
interfering,44 as discussed above. 
Another statute which falls into this 
area of the law is Article 27, section 123, 
disorderlyconduct.45 While the statute it-
self appears to have little to do with dis-
obedience to or interference with police 
procedures, the courts have interpreted 
the statute to include precisely that be-
havior. In Drews v. State,46 the facts in-
volved a policy, established by an amuse-
ment park, which prohibited blacks from 
entering the park. Drews, a white man, 
had gone to the park in the company of 
four other individuals, two of whom 
were black. They were ordered to leave 
the park several times and when they re-
fused, they were placed under arrest for 
disorderly conduct. Drews appealed his 
conviction claiming that even though the 
group was deliberately trespassing, they 
had done nothing which constituted a 
breach of the public peace. They had 
merely refused to leave when ordered to 
do so by the management and the police. 
In answering this argument, the court 
stated that the gist of the crime of disor-
derly conduct "is the doing or saying, or 
both, of that which offends, disturbs, in-
Cites, or tends to incite a number of 
people gathered in the same area. "47 
When Drews and his companions re-
fused to leave the park, a large crowd 
gathered to watch the argument. The 
persons arrested joined hands, refused 
to leave and had to be physically removed 
from the premises. "[FJailure to obey a 
policeman's command to move on when 
not to do so may endanger the public 
peace, amounts to disorderly conduct."48 
While arguably the behavior in Drews 
was in and of itself disorderly in nature, 
the courts have applied this rationale in 
several "more peaceable" situations. In 
Sharpe v. State,49 a police officer re-
quested the driver of a vehicle stopped 
for a traffic violation to remove his license 
from his wallet. The driver raised his 
voice slightly, and when he uttered a 
profane expletive, he was arrested for 
disorderly conduct. There were no 
crowds and only the officer was present. 
In affirming Sharpe's conviction, the 
court rationalized that the "[r]efusal to 
obey a proper order of an officer may 
constitute an offense justifying an arrest, 
particularly where there is profanity in 
the presence of others that may threaten 
a breach of the peace. "50 
U{rjefusal to obey a 
proper order of an 
officer may consti-
tute an offense ... " 
Many local jurisdictions have enacted 
ordinances along these same lines. Gen-
erally entitled "lOitering," these ordi-
nances permit an officer to arrest an 
individual who remains in an area after 
being ordered to leave by the police offi-
cer. While the specific prohibitions vary 
from area to area, most require a show-
ing that the individual ordered to leave 
did not have any lawful business in the 
area. If the officer returns within a speci-
fied time period, and the individual pre-
viously warned is still present, he can be 
arrested. The Baltimore City Council re-
cently enacted a "super-loitering" ordi-
nance creating "drug free zones" in an 
attempt to alleviate the increaSingly seri-
ous problem of "open-air" drug markets 
operating on street corners.51 Areas 
known for high narcotics traffic are con-
spicuously posted. The signs take the 
place of prior notification by police. The 
ordinance states that "[ a] police officer 
shall first request a person suspected of 
loitering under this section within a drug 
free zone to leave the premises. Failure to 
obey the police officer shall subject the 
person to arrest."52 It must be shown that 
a person is "behaving in a manner raising 
a reasonable belief that the person is 
engaging or is about to engage in illegal 
drug activity. "5~ The ordinance provides 
circumstances which may be considered 
in establishing this reasonable belief in-
eluding information received from reli-
able sources, membership in a gang or 
association which routinely engages in il-
legal drug activity, or actual activity ob-
served, such as exchanging small pack-
ages for money or operating as a lookout. 
B) 1RANSPORTA110N ARl1CLE 
Although the General Assembly has 
passed few statutes in this area of the law 
with regards to the criminal code (Article 
27), the Transportation Article has sev-
eral sections which apply. Section 16-
112(e) states that "[a] person may not 
give the name of another person or give 
a false or fictitious name to any uni-
formed police officer who is attempting 
to determine the identity of a driver of a 
motor vehicle."54 Note that the statute is 
applicable only in the limited circum-
stances stated and is not a blanket ban. If 
the officer is in plain clothes, or if the in-
vestigation is for a different purpose, for 
example, identifying passengers, then 
the section does not apply. The maxi-
mum penalty is a fine of $255.55 
Far more serious is the crime of fleeing 
and eluding a police officer. Section 21-
904 prohibits any attempt to flee or avoid 
apprehension by a police officer who is 
attempting to effect a traffic stop.56 The 
section prohibits fleeing by failing to stop 
a moving vehicle, fleeing on foot, or 
fleeing by other means. The police officer 
must either be in uniform, or operating 
an "appropriately marked official police 
vehicle," and must give a visual or an au-
dible signal to stop. The penalty for a first 
violation of this section is a $1000 fine, 
one year incarceration, or both. For a 
subsequent violation, the potential in-
carceration increases to two years. Viola-
tions may also result in revocation of the 
operator's privilege to drive, since twelve 
points are assessed on the driving record. 
Section 21-10357 provides perhaps the 
broadest power to a police officer speci-
fied anywhere in the code. The section 
states that "[a] person may not lawfully 
disobey any lawful order-or direction of 
any police officer."58 Since this section 
includes no limitations, it is possible that 
this catch-all provision may apply beyond 
situations involving motor vehicles. It is a 
misdemeanor, as are all violations of the 
Transportation Article, and has a maxi-
mum fine of $255. 
IV. Conclusion 
The job of a police officer is difficult at 
best. The specialized group of legal pro-
nouncements discussed in this article 
assist officers by facilitating cooperation 
and punishing those who intentionally 
impede the smooth flow of the criminal 
justice system. However, misunder-
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standing of these laws, misapplication by 
the police, and misinterpretation by the 
legal community have exacerbated the 
problems. Over a century ago, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland emphasized the 
importance of providing aid and assis-
tance to law enforcement.59 It is hoped 
that by clarifying the laws surrounding 
this unique profession, this article has 
simplified compliance with the court's 
mandate. 
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